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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HUSBAND'S BURDEN OF
PROVIDING ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
Louisiana's statutory scheme regulating alimony has been increasing-
ly attacked as a violation of the equal protection guarantee of Article 1,
Section 3 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution due to the male-female
distinction employed in Louisiana's statutes. ' While its prohibition against
sex discrimination is not absolute, the Louisiana Constitution does require
that a legitimate state interest be served by the sex distinction and that the
differentiation bear a reasonable relationship to the objective of the legisla-
tion. 2 Although Louisiana's alimony provisions may be prompted by the
state's interest in protecting a spouse who is left in a disadvantaged
financial position due to the breakup of a marriage, the state's decision to
impose on the husband the burden of support is unreasonable when one
considers that the state's interest could be better facilitated by determining
the parties' needs and ability to provide alimony, based on actual circum-
stances rather than arbitrary sexual presumptions.
Louisiana courts have been reluctant to sustain equal protection
attacks on Civil Code articles 148 and 160 which provide alimony only for
1. See Welsh v. Welsh, 332 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd sub nom.
Johnson v. Welsh, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976) (separate domicile of wife); Williams v.
Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976) (alimony pendente lite); State v. Barton, 315 So.
2d 289 (La. 1975) (criminal neglect of family); State v. Robertson, (24th Judicial
District), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 839 (La. 1974) (criminal neglect of family);
Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (maternal prefer-
ence rule); Whitt v. Vauthier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320
So. 2d 558 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (alimony after divorce).
2. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 provides inter alia: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. . . . No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or un-
reasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physi-
cal condition, or political ideas or affiliations." See Hargrave, The Declaration of
Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. l, 6 (1975). The
Louisiana Constitutional Convention fashioned the amendment from federal equal
protection jurisprudence, STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTs August 30, 1973 at 3. Although the United States
Supreme Court has not yet held that sex classifications are "suspect" and subject
to strict scrutiny, even the lesser standard is now more demanding. See Matthews
v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2762 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See
Barham, Introduction: Equal Rights for Women Versus the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L.
REV. 560 (1974); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 536 (1976).
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the wife. Alimony pendente lite, as provided by article 148,1 is a legisla-
tive recognition of the husband's obligation to support his wife during the
existence of the marriage.4 The wife's needs are determined from her
actual income, 5 whereas some courts consider the husband's potential as
well as actual economic resources in determining his ability to pay.
6
Article 148 survived "on face" equal protection scrutiny in Williams v.
Williams,7 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld alimony pen-
dente lite for women only and based its decision on the belief that due to
the wife's lack of control over her earnings and revenues, it is reasonable
for the legislature to afford her special protection during the final stages of
the community's existence. 8
The husband not only has a duty to support his wife during the
marriage but also once the marriage has been dissolved. Alimony after
divorce, governed by article 160, 9 is a pension given to the ex-wife who
does not have sufficient means for her support. 0 The burden is placed on
the wife to prove that she is unable to supply her needs from not only her
income but from all her available actual resources. " The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal in Whitt v. Vauthier 2 upheld the constitutional validity
of alimony for wives only based partly on its recognition that divorced
women are in a disadvantaged position and need protection and that in
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 148: "If the wife has not a sufficient income for her
maintenance pending the suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce, the
judge shall allow her, whether she appears as plaintiff or defendant, a sum for her
support, proportioned to her needs and to the means of her husband."
4. See Murphy v. Murphy, 229 La. 849, 87 So. 2d 4 (1956); Eals v. Swann, 221
La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952).
5. See, e.g., Bilello v. Bilello, 240 La. 158, 121 So. 2d 728 (1960).
6. A determination is made concerning the husband's capacity to earn. To
avoid liability, he is required to prove that he is absolutely unemployable. See
Zaccaria v. Beoubay, 213 La. 782, 35 So. 2d 659 (1948); Sykes v. Sykes, 308 So. 2d
816 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Viser v. Viser, 179 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
7. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
8. Id. at 440.
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160 provides inter alia: "When the wife ... has not
sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and
earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his in-
come. .... "
10. See Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974); Hays v. Hays, 240 La.
708, 124 So. 2d 917 (1961).
11. See Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950). But see Chaisson v.
Domingue, 175 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
12. 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 558 (La. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
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accordance with "[c]ivilian principles" the husband may receive alimony
after divorce.1
3
Although Civil Code article 227 imposes an obligation on both the
husband and the wife to provide support for their children,14 courts have
been hesitant to enforce the mother's duty of support and have almost
apologetically applied article 227 to females. 15 As in establishing an award
of alimony for a wife or a divorced wife, the woman's potential earning
capacity has not been a factor used by the courts in determining an award
of child support. The jurisprudence is to the effect that it is only the
working mother who has a duty to support her children 16 or that the
obligation is fulfilled when the mother performs day-to-day services for
the children.' 7 Thus, the mother's duty of support has been treated more as
a contribution to aid the father rather than as a mutual obligation to support
her children.' 8 However, the courts have been willing to enforce fully the
father's burden of financial support, and no distinction has been drawn
between employed and unemployed fathers.19
13. Id. at 205. The basis for the Fourth Circuit's statement was an assumption
that the Code Napoleon of 1804 was in effect in Louisiana. Code Napoleon article
301 (1804) provided alimony after divorce for either spouse. Although the Louisiana
Digest of 1808 did not contain any alimony provisions, only those prior laws which
were contrary to the Digest were repealed. When the legislature provided alimony
for divorced wives in 1827, the court held that there was no intention to "foreclose
against needy husbands .... " Since alimony for the divorced husband "was once
available by virtue of a positive statute in the Code Napol6on..." and there has
been no "positive legislative statement" to the contrary, a needy divorced husband
can receive alimony. Id. at 205, 206. The court's position is untenable since the
Code Napol6on was never in force in Louisiana. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM pt. 1, 54, 55 (1971).
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 227: "Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying,
contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining and educating their
children."
15. See Moreland v. Moreland, 279 So. 2d 266, 268 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 281 So. 2d 749 (La. 1973); Fellows v. Fellows, 267 So. 2d 572, 575 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1973); Zara v. Zara, 204 So. 2d 76, 79 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
16. Grishman v. Grishman, 332 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Moreland
v. Moreland, 279 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 749 (La.
1973); Price v. Price, 272 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
17. See Nelson v. Nelson, 335 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Fall v.
Fontenot, 307 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
18. See Black v. Black, 205 La. 861, 18 So. 2d 321 (1944); Zara v. Zara, 204 So.
2d 76 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Poydras v. Poydras, 155 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963); Qvistgaard-Petersen v. Qvistgaard-Petersen, 135 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
19. The father must prove he is absolutely unemployable to avoid liability. See
Sykes v. Sykes, 308 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). Compare Hampson v.
Hampson, 271 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (the determination of the
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Departing from the prior jurisprudence, recent appellate court deci-
sions have used equal protection arguments to lessen the financial burden
placed on husbands to provide alimony and child support by requiring
wives to secure employment. In Ward v. Ward2" and Favrot v Barnes2
the Fourth Circuit re-examined the traditional technique of awarding
alimony after divorce and the factors used to determine the amount the
husband must pay. In both cases the husband appealed, arguing that his
wife was capable of working and therefore not entitled to alimony. 22
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit held in Ward that a divorced wife must
support herself when she is capable unless there is a valid and compelling
reason preventing her from doing so. 23 To reach this result, Ward con-
cluded that the same elements that are used to determine the husband's
means to provide alimony pendente lite, which include earning potential,
should become a factor in establishing the sufficiency of the wife's
means. 24 This expanded definition of the wife's means was based on the
lack of a valid reason for distinguishing between the economic capabilities
of the sexes.2 5 In Favrot the court emphasized the unreasonableness of
refusing to weigh the wife's earning potential and noted that it was
repugnant to "constitutional principles of justice administered without
husband's ability to pay) with Tjaden v. Tjaden, 294 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 838 (La. 1974) (the treatment of the wife's ability to find
employment).
20. 332 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 339 So. 2d 839 (La. 1976).
21. 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976).
22. The wife in Ward had thirteen and one-half years experience as a school
teacher and also had an extensive educational background. She had last worked in
1971 for the public schools of Orleans Parish at an annual salary of $10,400. In
Favrot the wife had taught school before the marriage.
23. The case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of giving Mrs.
Ward an opportunity to show that work was unavailable. In denying a rehearing the
court stated that the availability of work is not the only factor involved as there may
be "many valid and compelling reasons why a divorced wife could not accept
available work she is capable of performing." In Mendoza v. Mendoza, 310 So. 2d
154, 158 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), Judge Redmann, in dissent, stated that the wife
should be allowed alimony for one month during which she must seek fulltime
employment, with leave to apply for an additional month or months of support on
her showing of a good faith attempt to secure employment.
24. 332 So. 2d at 872: "The same word, 'means', is used in the same manner in
both articles, the only difference being that in Article 148 the reference is to the
husband's 'means', while in Article 160 the reference is to the wife's means."
25. Id. "If the word (means) as used in Article 148 includes the ability to work
and earn an income, and we are satisfied our jurisprudence is to that effect, it
should received (sic) the same interpretation in Article 160." Although the court in
Ward spoke in terms of reasonableness (the basic equal protection test) no specific
mention was made of equal protection.
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impartiality .. ."26 The court treated Article 1, Section 327 as potent
and revolutionary, yet the minimal discussion concerning equal protection
may have represented an attempt to refrain from language that could be
interpreted as supportive of wholesale equal protection attacks.
Likewise, the Third Circuit in Ducote v Ducote28 utilized the new
constitution to temper the parental obligation to provide child support.
Ducote involved a father's appeal of a judgment increasing child support
payments. Although the court affirmed the increase in favor of the
mother, 29 it recognized in dicta that in some circumstances a wife should
be compelled to seek employment in order to contribute to the support of
her children.3" The basis for the decision was a combination of a concern
for equal protection and a belief that the court should take cognizance of
all the pertinent circumstances of both the husband and wife.3 ' Due to the
presence of three young children in the mother's custody, the court
decided that she was justified in remaining at home. 32 Since it was
necessary for her to care for and supervise the children and to provide
transportation to and from school, she was not compelled to seek employ-
ment.
33
The appellate courts' lessening of the husband's burden to provide
alimony received a mixed reaction by the Louisiana Supreme Court which
granted writs on Ward, Favrot and Ducote. The court reaffirmed the prior
jurisprudence concerning alimony after divorce but in dicta possibly ap-
proved a new method of awarding child support. 34
A divided supreme court 35 reversed Ward and Favrot and held that
an unemployed wife's potential earning capacity is not a proper factor in
26. 332 So. 2d at 876 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976).
27. See note 2, supra.
28. 331 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir.), aff'd, 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976).
29. Id. at 137. An increase was granted in order to allow the divorced wife to
purchase a new automobile and because the children were entitled to be maintained
in the same standard of living as would be their custom if living with the father.
30. Id. at 138.
31. The Third Circuit did not elaborate on its reasons for expanding the obliga-
tion of the mother. The court merely cited LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 and Marcus v.
Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122 (La. 1973), in which the supreme court allowed the expense
of the father's second marriage to be considered in ascertaining the amount of child
support. The basis for that decision was LA. CIv. CODE art. 231 which provides that
alimony shall be granted according to "the circumstances of those who are to pay
it."
32. The three daughters were ages 14, 10, and 9. 339 So. 2d at 838 (La. 1976).
33. 331 So. 2d at 138.
34. 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976). See note 43, infra.
35. Justices Summers, Calogero and Dennis dissented.
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determining her means.3 6 The court also held there was no difference
between the interpretation of "means" as found in articles 148 and 160
but the court's treatment of the term in the two articles indicates the
inaccuracy of that statement. Affirming prior jurisprudence, 37 the court
stated that a wife's "means" refers only to actual resources, such as
property or money and not potential resources,38 even though such poten-
tial resources as employability are considered to form part of the hus-
band's "means" in article 148. While the court acknowledged that the
husband cannot escape having to provide alimony pendente lite by refus-
ing to work, it reasoned that this difference was based on the husband's
onerous obligation to support his wife under Civil Code article 120,"9 and
not a different definition of "means" in article 160.
Generally, Louisiana courts place undue emphasis on article 120 as
the source of the husband's additional duty of support. Article 120 im-
poses a duty on the husband to furnish his wife with the conveniences of
life but the wife has a reciprocal obligation to live with the husband
wherever he chooses to reside.4" The obligation should cease to exist when
she refuses to reside with her husband without having lawful cause. 4 Yet
36. The Third Circuit in Gravel v. Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976), stated in dicta that alimony pendente lite would be denied to a wife capable of
earning sufficient income for her support. The court relied on Article 1, Section 3
but the wife was not forced to seek employment because she was attending school
and had custody of two minor children. Although Gravel was not appealed to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the supreme court's discussion of article 148 in Ward
tends to reaffirm the pre-Gravel jurisprudence that a wife is entitled to alimony
pendente lite and is not required to obtain employment to support herself. Cooper v.
Cooper, 336 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), followed the same rationale as
Gravel. However, Best v. Best, 337 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), states that a
wife is not required to work and support herself during the pendancy of a suit for
separation or divorce, and represents a divergence of opinion on Gravel within the
Third Circuit.
37. See note 11, supra.
38. 339 So. 2d at 842.
39. Id.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 120: "The wife is bound to live with her husband and to
follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and
furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to
his means and condition." R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 70, 71 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as PASCAL]; I M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. i,
nos. 893-95 at 514-16 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 939).
41. PASCAL, supra note 40, at 70, 71: "The [husband's obligation under article
120] ceases whenever the wife fails to live with her husband without having just
cause. This does not mean, however, that the ordinary obligations of support and
assistance cease to exist."
[Vol. 37
Louisiana jurisprudence reconstructs article 120 to require the husband to
provide this support regardless of whether the wife fulfills her obligation.
In effect, the court treated the different burden placed on males and
females as immune from equal protection analysis because it was based on
a Civil Code provision. The court failed to discuss the equal protection
arguments that proved successful at the appellate level and was more
concerned with presenting a view which minimized the significance of
alimony. It emphasized that the wife must not be at fault and that the
award is limited to cover only the basic necessities.42 Additionally, the
court recognized that because alimony after divorce provides for the wife's
maintenance and not for the style of living to which she has been accus-
tomed, the necessary incentive for a divorced wife to work is present.
In Ducote the supreme court in dicta approached differently the
wife's potential earning capacity and conceivably acquiesced in the Third
Circuit's buttressing of the wife's obligation to provide child support
since, despite the fact that the court upheld the rejection of the husband's
contention that his former wife should seek employment, the rejection was
not based on the absence of a duty to work on the wife's part. 43 The court
declared that the mother's custody of three minor children rendered her
unavailable for employment." By virtue of this language, the court
intimates that if the mother is capable of securing employment, she must
work if necessary to fulfill her duty of support. This would be a departure
from prior jurisprudence which has not required a wife to seek employ-
ment in order to provide child support. Reasons underlying this possible
expansion of the mother's obligation were not discussed by the court.
Although the Third Circuit based its decision on the state constitution's
equal protection guarantee, the supreme court did not mention it.
The dictum in Ducote is weak because of the court's discussion of
factors which could prevent the mother from having to seek employ-
ment. 45 For instance, the court stated that young children need the atten-
tion of their mother and if she provides "day-to-day" services, it will
contribute "substantially" to the fulfillment of her obligation of support. 46
42. 339 So. 2d at 842. However, "basic necessities" was expanded in Bern-
hardt v. Bernhardt, 285 So. 2d 226 (La. 1973).
43. Id. at 839. The court did not expressly state that a mother need not work if
she is capable of employment. Instead the court discussed the circumstances which
allowed the divorced wife to escape employment.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. As a result of the maternal preference rule the mother is usually given
custody of the children. Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir.
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The court left unanswered whether it is the wife's burden to prove the
reasons why she should not accept available work and to what extent her
reasons must be valid or compelling. No indication was given when
children no longer need the constant attention of their mother or what
guidelines will be used to measure the performance of day-to-day services
against the mother's duty of support. 47 Furthermore, due to the inchoate-
ness of its position, the court may not have been sanctioning a duty
requiring the wife to seek employment but only endorsing jurisprudence
which recognizes that performance of day-to-day services satisfies the
wife's obligation of support.
While the state concededly does have an interest in protecting a
spouse left in a disadvantaged financial position, the relationship between
allowing an ex-wife who is capable of employment to avoid work and the
state's objective is tenuous. The approach of the courts of appeal in
determining alimony and child support seems more reasonable because it
established the needs and abilities of the parties in a like manner while at
the same time recognizing that there are circumstances, such as raising
children, which would affect a finding of whether or not the wife is
capable of employment. The intent of the appellate courts was to interpret
the alimony articles in compliance with the Louisiana Constitution, and
also to ease the financial burden placed on the husband, while the supreme
court was concerned only with the technical application of the code
articles. The supreme court was unwilling to examine the alimony provi-
sions and determine whether the sex classifications they contain are
reasonable or permissible as a form of benign discrimination. 48 The court,
firm in its belief that the husband is the chief protector and provider for the
family, may have realized that if it dealt with the equal protection issue it
would have been difficult to justify the sex differentiations in terms of
1975). If the courts adhere to the belief that young children need the attention of
their mother, she may not be forced to secure employment to support them unless
they are in their mid- or late teens. Once an individual reaches the age of majority he
is not "in need" if he is capable of gainful employment. Demarie v. Demarie, 295
So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Dubroc v. Dubroc, 284 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1974).
47. 339 So. 2d at 839. Although the daughters were school age (14, 10, and 9),
the court stated that they needed the attention of their mother. The court did not
discuss the possibility of the mother, who is a licensed and qualified nurse, working
a 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. hospital shift which presumbably would not interfere with the
mother's watching over the children. See Gravel v. Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976) (court stated that a divorced wife need not work since she was
enrolled as a fulltime graduate student and also cared for and supervised her two
minor children).
48. 339 So. 2d at 839.
reasonableness.4 9 Louisiana is therefore left with an alimony scheme
which allows the wife or ex-wife to place the burden of support on her
husband by her refusal to work, without any justification for such a
system. Now that Louisiana's alimony scheme has escaped constitutional
"scrutiny," the only change from the prior jurisprudence may be a
lessening of the husband's duty to support his children and perhaps the
husband may receive alimony after divorce if subsequent decisions follow
the dicta in Whitt v. Vauthier. In its refusal to face the problem of sex
discrimination in Ward and Favrot the court missed an opportunity to
revise its interpretation of the alimony articles to make the burden on the
husband more reasonable. However, due to the holdings of the supreme
court, an ex-wife may refuse to supply her own needs for reasons of
"indolence, spite or revenge" '50 and force her ex-husband to support her.
Douglas C. Longman, Jr.
THE NATURE OF ALIMONY-SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY OBLIGATION?
Following a judgment of separation from his second wife, a husband
sued for partition of the community property. The wife sought reimburse-
ment for one half of the alimony and child support payments made by her
husband to his first wife using funds of the second community. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the wife was not entitled to reimburse-
ment.' The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling
with regard to the alimony and child support payments2 and held that
because the obligations to pay alimony and child support are imposed by
49. The United States Supreme Court upheld classifications which discrimi-
nated against men in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), as more stringent promotion requirements for male
officers and a state taxation plan granting property tax deduction to widows but not
to widowers were approved. Both classifications were concerned with a female
receiving benefits from the state or governmental operation and not a classification
that levied a duty on the male to provide a female with a portion of his economic
resources. But see Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E. 2d 458 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
50. 339 So. 2d at 843.
I. Connell v. Connell, 316 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
2. The judgment was amended on other grounds, however.
1977] NOTES
